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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vROBERT JORDAN, JR. and
TERRY FULLMER,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case Nos.
18235 and 18236

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF ·THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal from convictions of violations of Section
76-10-1206.5 U.C.A.

(1953) as amended.

Appellants claim this

statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally
vague in that the statute infringes on their rights to free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.

Appellants also claim that the physical

evidence obtained from searches of the persons and property of
the defendants was obtained in violation of the rights of defendants under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution
of Utah, and Utah Code Annotated 76-10-1212.

Trial was held in

this matter before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, sitting withour a jury, on December 9, 1981.

The verdict of guilty was

brought in by the Judge, after taking the matter under advisement,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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on December 14, 1981, and the judgment and sentence was rendered
on January 22, 1982.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Honorable J. Robert Bullock of
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, in and for Utah
County, sitting without a jury.

Defendants appeal from a judg-

ment of guilty entered by Judge Bullock and from the evidentiary
rulings made by the Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment and conviction
and a declaration by this Court that Section 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A.
is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to these defendants.
In the alternative, appellants seek a remand to the District Court
for retrial, with instructions to suppress all physical evidence
obtained from defendants as a result of the unlawful search and
seizure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants are an unmarried couple who had lived together
as husband and wife for some period prior to September 15, 1981.
For about two years, defendants had been friendly with Holly
Wilkerson (date of birth: January 8, 1966) and on occasions
prior to this date they had told her of their interest in photography.

Specifically, they had occasionally taken pictures of

each other, and one or two other friends, in the nude.

They had

also told her that they had had some financial trouble and
pawned their camera.

The evidence at trial showed that during

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the period of this relationship, up to and including September
15, 1981, Holly Wilkerson deliberately led defendants to believe
that she was considerably older than she really was, out of fear
that they would not consider her as close a friend if they knew
her true age (T. 134-136).

The effect of this evidence was

controverted by the testimony of Judith Wilkerson, Holly's mother,
who testified that she had told defendant, Terry Fullmer, either
in late June or early July of 1980, that her daughter was, at
that time, only fourteen

(T. 143-144).

Sometime around the first of September, 1981, defendant
Terry Fullmer, asked Holly Wilkerson if she could borrow Holly's
Polaroid instant camera, and indicated that she would probably
want to use it for some nude photography.

There was also some

discussion at that time as to whether Holly would be interested
in posing in the nude, but apparently no decision was made.

On

September 15, Holly went to the home of defendants with her camera
and was asked again if she would be interested in posing in the
nude.

She said she was willing, and various pictures were taken

in which she, and each of the defendants, appeared nude, either
separately or together (T.122-127).

The State alleged that several

of the pictures contained "simulated sex acts", but the Court
appears to have made no ruling on that contention.

The evidence

was uncontroverted that no pressure of any kind was brought to
bear on Miss Wilkerson to pose, that no actual sex acts took
place involving her and either of the defendants on that date,
and that no discussions were had concerning commercial use of the

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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photographs (T. 136-137).
On or about November 1, 1981, a search warrant was issued
for the residence of defendants based upon information from a
confidential police informant which resulted in the seizure of
265 photographs (T. 128-129), unexposed film, flash cubes, a cloth
sack, and a General Electric color television set (T.85).

Thirty

of the photographs were offered and received as evidence over the
objection of the defendants (T. 132-133).

(Although the Court

reserved ruling on the admissibility of the photographs as to
defendant Jordan, in view of the Court's finding of guilty it is
assumed that the Court received those exhibits as to Jordan as
well.)

As a result of that visit, a search warrant was obtained,

and defendants were arrested and prosecuted under an Information
which recited as follows:
The undersigned, Pete Hanson, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendants committed
the crimes of:
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF A MINOR, a second degree felony,
at Utah County, Utah, on or about September 15, 1981,
in violation of Section 76-10-1206.5, Utah Criminal Code,
as amended, in that they, at the time and place aforesaid, knowingly and intentionally used, persuaded, induced
or enticed Holly Wilkerson, a minor, to pose in the nude
for the purpose of photographing, filming, recording, or
displaying sexual or simulated sexual conduct.
Defendants were each convicted under that Information, and from
those convictions, they appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. IS INVALID ON ITS FACE
AS At.'! UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF
FREE SPEECH.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-4-

The 1979 session of the Utah Legislature passed Section
76-10-1206.5 as a part of a nation-wide drive to prohibit the
use of minors in pornographic photographs and films.

That section

was amended by the 1981 Legislature to broaden the language so as
to prohibit the photography of minors in the nude.
reads as follows:

That section

(1981 amendments are underlined)

Section 76-10-1206.5. Sexual exploitation of minors.
(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a
minor who knowingly employs, uses, persuades, induces,
entices or coerces any minor to pose in the nude for
the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or for
profit or to engage in any sexual or simulated sexual
conduct for the purpose of photographing, filming, recording or displaying in any way the sexual or simulated
sexual conduct.
(2) Any person who photographs, films, or records in
any way minors in the nude for the purpose of sexual
arousal of any person or for profit or engaged in any
sexual or simulated sexual conduct is guilty of sexual
exploitation of a minor.
(3)
Any person who displays, distributes, possesses
for the purpose of distributing, or sells material
depicting minors in the nude dr engaging in sexual
or simulated sexual conduct is guilty of sexual exploitation of minors.
(4)
It is not a defense to this section that the
person who is charged with sexual exploitation of a
minor is parent, legal guardian or other person exercising legal control of the child who was the subject
of the exploitation.
(5) A violation of this section is a felony of the
second degree.
The Information under which defendants were charged and convicted
appears to be a conglomeration of the new and old language in subparagraph (1).

The exact nature of the conduct charged against

these defendants, and that proven at trial, will be examined later.

-5-
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For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that a finding
that the defendants knowingly used a minor to pose in the nude for
either the sexual arousal of any person or for profit, while photographing her, is enough to obtain a conviction for violation of
this code section.

Defendants contend that the broad language of

the statute renders it invalid on its face, whether or not the
conduct of these defendants could have been constitutionally
proscribed by a narrowly drawn statute.
In

the case of Doran vs. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 930(1975),

the United States Supreme Court affirmed a temporary injunction
issued against enforcement of a town ordinance prohibiting topless dancing.

Plaintiffs, who sought declaratory relief against

the ordinance of a town in New York State, were the operators of
three bars, dispensing alcoholic beverages and providing topless
dancing as entertainment for its customers.

The Court, in sus-

taining the injunction against enforcement of the

ordinance~

referred to its previous decision in California vs. LaRue, 409
U.S. 109(1972).

That decision held that the powers of the states

to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages under the Twenty-first
Amendment, outweigh any First Amendment interest in nude dancing
and that a state can therefore ban such dancing in bars, under
its power to license the dispensing of liquor.

The Court, never-

theless, indicated preliminarily that it was proper to enjoin
the enforcement of this law, because of its overbreadth.

The

Court observed:
In the present case,
not merely to places
other establishments
observed, we believe

a challenged ordinance applies
which serve liquor, but to many
as well. The District Court
correctly:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits
topless dancing in bars but also prohibits any female
from appearing in 'any public place' with uncovered
breasts. There is no limit to the imterpretation of
the term 'any public place'. It could include the
theater, town hall, opera house, as well as a public
market place, street or any place of assembly, indoors
or outdoors. Thus, this ordinance would prohibit the
performance of the 'Ballet Africains' and a number of
other works of unquestionable artistic and socially
redeeming significance." 364F Supp., at 483.
We have previously held that even though a statute or
ordinance may be constitutionally applied to the
activities of a particular defendant, that defendant
may challenge it on the basis of over-breadth if it
is so drawn as to sweep within its ambit protected
speech or expression of other persons not before the
Court. As we said in Grayned vs. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 s.ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222
(1972):
"Because over-broad laws, like vague ones, deter
privileged activity, our cases firmly establish
Appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge." 422 U.S. at 933.
Appellants in this case, then, clearly have the right to
challenge the statute in question, even if the acts alleged by
the State in this particular instance could be validly prohibited.
A long line of cases on both the State and Federal level
have made it clear that photographs, movies and other forms of
artistic expression, come within the purview of the First Amendment protection against infringement of free speech.

Also, a

long line of cases on the Federal level indicate that the Federal
prohibitions against infringement of free speech apply to the
States, under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Utah, of course, has its

own similar prohibition, in Article I, Section 15.

The United

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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States Supreme Court has dealt with the question of what limits
States may put on artistic expression in books, photographs and
films, on several occasions.
476

In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.

(1957) the Court stated:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance - unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion - have the full protection of the (First Amendment) guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach
upon the limited area of more important interests. But
implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming
social importance.
354 U.S. at 484

The Supreme Court, in that case 1 set standards under which the
Court could ban production or
and films, as obscene.

distribution of books, photographs

Those standards, however, were found to

be difficult to apply, and the Court re-examined them and set more
concrete standards in the case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1972):
State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials
must be carefully limited.
(citations omitted). As a
result, we now confine the permissable scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual
conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by
the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
construed. A state offense must also be limited to works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest
in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
The basic guideline for the trier of fact must be: (a)
whether "the average person applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, (citations omitted);
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
413 U.S. at 23 through 24.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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The Court went on to indicate that some freedom of definition was to be accorded to individual states, and to give examples
of what a state might regulate, as follows:
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose
regulatory schemes for the States. That must await
their concrete legislative efforts. It is possible,
however, to give a few plain examples of what a state
statute could define for regulation under part (b) of
the standard announced in this opinion, supra:
(a)
Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of ultimate sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or
simulated.
(b)
Patently offensive representation or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and
lewd exibition of the genitals.
413 U.S. at 25.
And, for one further clarification as to what types of
materials could be excluded from the public, the Court stated thusly:
Under the holdings announced today, no one will be
subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of
obscene materials unless these materials depict or
describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct
specifically defined by the regulating state law, as
written or construed.
413 U.S. at 27.
The Legislature of the State of Utah, then, has taken an
act that was originally designed to protect minors against their
use in pronography, and greatly expanded the types of material
prohibited.
overbroad.

This expansion makes the law unconstitutionally
The Court in Miller v. California clearly stated the

standards of sexual conduct, the depiction of which may be prohibited, which standards do not exist in the law as modified by
the 1981 Legislature.
How far the statute at issue here goes beyond the limits
allowed by Miller v. California is illustrated by the definition
of nudity contained in Section 76-10-1201 (6) U.C.A.

(1953) as

-9-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amended.

The definitions, as part of Title 76, Chapter 26, Part

12 of the Criminal Code, are meant to be used with all portions
of that part.

That section reads as follows:

'Nudity' means the showing of a human male or female
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less than an
opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals
in a discrenably turgid state.
Reading that definition into the statute renders the statute not
only hopelessly overbroad, but absolutely ridiculous and foolish.
The statute prohibits, on its face, even a parent from taking a
picture of a three month old daughter wearing nothing but a diaper,
and then submitting it to any kind of a photography contest where
prizes (profit) are offered.

To further illustrate the breadth

of the statute, counsel for appellants purchased a greeting card
during the month of April, 1982, in a Grand Central store in
Salt Lake City.

A copy of that greeting card is included in the

Brief as appendix A.

Obviously, the person on the first page of

the greeting card is a female.

If, as is only a guess, the child

on the inside of the greeting card is also a female, "any person
who displays, distributes, possesses for the purpose of distributing,or sells" this card in the State of Utah is guilty of a violation of the same act for which defendants have been convicted.
Under this law, many uses of children in advertising, especially
products for babies, would be banned in this state.

That may not

have been what the Legislature intended to accomplish, but that is
the clear meaning of the act.

In the 1968 case of Ginsberg vs.

New York, 390 U.S. 629, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a New York
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State law which protected minors from the sale of books and
magazines, including "girlie magazines", which were not obscene
for adults.

In doing so, the Court upheld the concept of "variable

obscenity".

In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibit-

ing the sale to minors of pictures that were "harmful to minors"
and had:
that quality of . . . representation . . . of nudity
(which) . . . (i) predominately appeals to the
prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in
the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly
without redeeming social importance for minors. 390 U.S.
at 633.
The Court there, in effect, found that the State of New York was
within its rights in defining pornography more broadly for minors,
than for adults.

The Court went on to say, however, that the New

York State of Appeals had defined the term "harmful to minors" as
"virtually identical to the Supreme Court's most recent statement
of the elements of obscenity."

390 U.S. at 643.

The Ginsberg case was decided the same day as its companion
case of Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,.(19!
While upholding the New York law, the Supreme Court struck down a
Dallas City ordinance which prohibited a motion picture exhibitor
from admitting children under 16 to films classified by a motion
picture classification board as "not suitable for young persons."
That term was defined in the ordinance as including films which
described or portrayed:
Nudity beyond the customary limits of candor in the
community, or sexual promiscuity or extra-marital or
abnormal sexual relations in such a manner as to be,
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in the judgment of the Board, likely to incite or
encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the
part of young persons or to appeal to their prurient
interest.
390 U.S. at 681.
The Court there found that definition to be unconstitutionally
vague and quoted Judge Fuld in People vs. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311,
258 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1965) in pointing out:
"It is, however, essential that legislation aimed at
protecting children from allegedly harmful expression
-- no less than legislation enacted with respect to
adults -- be clearly drawn and that the standards
adopted be reasonably precise so that those who are
governed by the law and those that administer it will
understand its meaning and application. 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 393, 390 U.S. at 689.
What both statutes had in common was that they attempted to prohibit exposure of children to materials involving nudity in a way
that was unfit for people of their age.

Obviously, exposure to

nudity itself, was insufficient, or the Court would have upheld
the Dallas ordinance as well.
That children may not be protected from all nudity was made
very clear and firm in a much later Supreme Court case, that of
Erznoznik vs. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

In that

case, the City of Jacksonville, Florida, passed the following
ordinance:
330.313 Drive-in theaters, films visible from public
streets or public places. It shall be unlawful and
it is hereby declared a public nuisance for any ticket
seller, ticket taker, usher, motion picture projection
machine operator, manager, owner, or any other person
connected with or employed by any drive-in theater in
the city to exhibit, or aid or assist in exhibiting,
any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in which
the human male or female bare buttocks, human female
bare breasts, or human bare pubic areas are shown, if
such motion picture, slide, or other exhibit is visible
from any public street or public place. Violation of
this section shall be punishable as a class C offense.
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The City of Jacksonville cited several grounds on which the
ordinance could be upheld, despite admitting that it went "far
beyond the permissible restraints on obscenity . . . " 422 U.S.
208.

The Court found no merit in any of the grounds, including

its attempts to protect children.

The Court addressed this

issue by saying:
Appelee also attempts to support the ordinance as an
exercise of the city's undoubted police power to protect children. Appellee maintains that even though it
cannot prohibit the display of films containing nudity
to adults, the present ordinance is a reasonable means
of protecting minors from this type of visual influence.
It is well settled that a State or municipality can
adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials
available to youth than on those available to adults.
(citations omitted)
Nevertheless, minors are entitled
to a significant measure of First Amendment protection,
(citations omitted), and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government bar public
dissemination of protected materials to them.
(citations
omitted) .
In this case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at prohibiting youth from viewing the films, the restriction
is broader than permissible. The ordinance is not
directed against sexually explicit nudity, nor is it
otherwise limited. Rather, it sweepingly forbids display of all films containing any uncovered buttocks or
breasts, irrespective of context or pervasiveness. Thus,
it would bar a film containing a picture of a baby's
buttocks, the nude body of a war victim, or scenes
from a culture in which nudity is indigenous. The
ordinance also might prohibit newsreel scenes of the
opening of an art exhibit as well as shots of bathers
on a beach. Clearly all nudity cannot be deemed obscene
even to minors.
(citations omitted)
Nor can such a
broad restriction be justified by any other governmental
interest pertaining to minors. Speech that is neither
obscene as to youth nor subject to some other legitimate
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them.
422 U.S. 212-214.
Clearly, the Legislature of the State of Utah has overstepped the bounds set by the U.S. Supreme Court in its attempts
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to protect minors in this constitutionally protected area.
Section 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. is overbroad in its entirety, and
must be invalidated in its entirety.
The Utah statute at issue here is one of many child pornography laws which have been enacted, mostly within the last
three years.
similar laws.

As of March, 1981, forty-six states had passed
(The material set forth herein as to the survey

of various state laws was obtained primarily from the brief of
Herald Price Fahringer, Paul Cambria and Barbara Davies Eberal,
dated March, 1981, and submitted to the New York Court of Appeals
in the case of People vs. Ferber, to be discussed later.

Most

of the information, with the exception of case law, contained
therein about laws of other states has not been independently
verified by counsel.)

In addition, Congress passed a Sexual

Exploitation of Children law in 1978.

The federal· law punishes

anyone who "employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any
other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting such
conduct . . . "and who then transports the material in interstate
or foreign commerce.

(18

uses

Section 2251).

The federal re-

quirement that the conduct be sexually explicit is defined in 18
USCS Section 2253 to parallel the requirements for obscenity as
set forth in Miller vs. California.

Twenty-five of the forty-six

states enacting child pornography laws have similar definitions
of sexual performance, limiting such laws in their effect to
material that is legally obscene.

Of those states that did not
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have obscenity requirements, none had yet been upheld as valid
by their state's highest court, as of March, 1981.

Two of the

twenty-one state statutes not requiring sexual explicit conduct
of the sort outlined in Miller vs. California have been struck
down.

The Texas law was declared unconstitutional in Graham vs.

Hill, 444 F.Supp.584 (W.D.Tex. 1978).

In that case, the owner

and manager of a movie theater and bookstore sued in Federal
Court for injunctive and declaratory relief from Section 43.25
of the Texas Penal Code which provided, in part, as follows:
(a}
A person commits an offense if, knowing the content
of the material, he sells, commercially distributes,
commercially exhibits, or possesses for sale, commercial
distribution, or commercial exhibition any motion picture
or photograph showing a person younger than seventeen
years of age observing or engaging in sexual conduct.
The Court, in ruling that section unconstitutional, referred to
several of the cases cited by appellants above, and then stated:
It is apparent that the statute could be applied to a
variety of works which, taken as a whole, very plainly
would not be the type of 'hard core' pornography referred to in the Supreme Court's opinion in Miller.
444 F. Supp. at 592.
In light of the total failure to require that the material
proscribed by Section 43.25 be obscene, the Court cannot
avoid the conclusion that the statute clearly is overbroad and that its deterrent effect on protected conduct
is both real and substantial, especially considering the
severe sanctions for violation of the statute. 444 F.Supp.
at 593.
The New York State Child Pornography Law includes two parallel
sections which read as follows:
Section 263.10 N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney)
Promoting an
obscene sexual performance by a child. A person is
guilty of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a
child when knowing the character and content thereof, he
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produces, directs or promotes any obscene performance
which includes sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age.
Section 263.15 Promoting a sexual performance by a child.
A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance by
a child when knowing the character and content thereof,
he produces, directs or promotes any performance which
includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen
years of age.
While no attack has been made against the constitutionality
of Section 263.10, Section 263.15 has been declared unconstitutional
by two Courts.

In St. Martins Press, Inc. vs.r. Carey, 440 F.Supp.

1196(S.D. N.Y. 1977) the publisher of a book to be used by parents
for educating their children about sex filed an action for declaratory judgment in Federal Court.

That Court issued a preliminary

injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance with regard
to the book published by plaintiff, saying that there was a serious
question as to whether the state law was overbroad in its application.

That case was reversed on appeal in St. Martins Press, Inc.

vs. Carey,

605 F.2d 41 (2nd Cir, 1979) and plaintiff's Complaint

was dismissed, on procedural grounds only, without reaching the
merits of the overbreadth contention.
That same New York law was once again attacked and declared
unconstitutionally overbroad in the case of People vs. Ferber,
52 N.Y. 2d 674, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981).

The New York

Court of Appeals found the State's interest in protecting minors
from harmful performances was insufficient to overcome the First
Amendment issues involved, and explained its holding by saying:
By the same token the effect on freedom of expression
is the same whether the govenment bluntly seeks to
censor what it finds offensive, or more benignly acts
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to protect the health and welfare of the performers.
Thus, no matter what the government's objective, First
Amendment standards remain applicable whenever the
effect of a government regulation is to curtail protected modes of expression.
439 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
In short, the statute discriminates against films and
other visual portrayals of non-obscene adolescent sex
solely on the basis of their content, and since no
justification has been shown for the distinction other
than special legislative distaste for this type of
portrayal, the statute cannot be sustained.
We merely hold that those who present plays, films, and
books portraying adolescence cannot be singled out for
punishment simply because they deal with adolescent sex
in a realistic but non-obscene manner.
439 N.Y.S.2d
at 866.
The statute struck down in the Graham and Ferber cases
were less all-inclusive than the statute here in Utah.
exactly the line may properly lie between

Where

First Amendment rights

and the State's interest in protecting children has not yet been
fully decided.

In fact, the United States Supreme Court

has~-

:

accepted the New York case for argument, and that case may yet
be overruled.

There is little doubt, however, that the line is

well short of the overbroad provisions of the Utah Act.
The same legislative session that passed the statute at
issue here also passed Section 76-10-1229 U.C.A.

(1953) as amended.

That section states, in part, "No person, including a franchisee,
shall knowingly distribute by wire or cable any pornographic or
indecent material to subscribers."
by Section 76-10-1227 U.C.A.
by the 1979 Legislature.

Indecent material is defined

(1953) as amended, which was passed

Indecent material is defined as either

"description or depictions of illicit sex or sexual immorality"
or "nude or partially denuded figures".

This act was enjoined by
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the Federal District Court for the District of Utah before it
went into effect.

On January 12, 1982, that statute was declared

unconstitutionally overbroad and the injunction was made permanent
by Judge Bruce Jenkins in the case of Home Box Office, Inc. vs.
Wilkinson, Civil No.C81-0331J (D.Utahl982) .Some of Judge Jenkins'
comments are appropriate to review here:
Construing Section 76-10-1229 according to the fair
import and even the plain meaning of its terms, it
becomes readily apparent that it seeks to deal with _
subject matter beyond hard-core pornography -- to go
beyond Miller -- and to do so without any of the safeguards mandated by Miller.
For example, through the definitions adopted by reference
from Section 76-10-1227(2), 'nude or partially denuded
figures' are encompassed within the reach of Section 7610-1229(4), it is well settled that nudity falls within
the protection afforded by the First Amendment, Jenkins
vs. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974); Schad vs. Mt.
Ephriam, 452 u.s,
, 101 s.ct. 2176 (1981), even when
viewed by minors.
Erznoznik vs. Cit.y of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 213 & n.10 (1975). To that extent, the statute
is clearly encroaching upon protected expression in an
unconstitutional manner and is facially defective. pg. 12
A court must look at the context of the material in the
manner specified by Miller. Yet under Section 1229(4)
sex and unprotected obscenity are made synonymous. It
is elementary that merely calling something obscene
doesn't make it so. Merely labeling something indecent
doesn't make i t so.
Counsel for the State argues that such a broad extension
of legislative authority heretofore proscribed areas may
be justified by the State's interests in protecting
children, and that materials accessible to children
should be governed by standards more strict than the
Miller standards.
Cf. Ginsberg vs. New York, 390 U.S.
629 (1968)
While in Ginsberg vs. New York, the Supreme Court
adopted a variation of the then current test of
obscenity announced in Roth vs. United States, supra,
and Memoirs vs. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1~66)
(plurality opinion) counsel cites no case in which the
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court has had opportunity to consider that issue in
light of Miller. See Erznoznik vs. City of Jacksonville,
Suora, 422 U.S. at 213 n.10. Since Ginsberg, the Court
has expressed the view that 'minors are entitled to a
significant measure of First Amendment protection' ,see
Tinker vs. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
and only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them . . . Erzndznik vs. City of
Jacksonville, supra, 422 U.S. at 212-213. pg. 13.
Section 76-10-1229(1) and (4) is unconstitutionally overbroad as to minors.
It is unconstitutionally overbroad
as to everyone. pg. 14.
Even though many of us may not approve or enjoy the forms
of expression that occur along the borderline that has
been drawn by the United States Supreme Court, we tolerate
them. pg. 22.
Like the statute struck down by the Federal Court last January,
this statute is unconstitutionally overbroad as to everyone.
The State Legislature does not have the power to protect minors,
or anyone else, from constitutionally protected freedom of expression simply by calling it "indecent", and does not have

the power

to prohibit the conduct sought to be prohibited in Section 76-101206.5.

This Court has no choice but to declare the statute

unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and to reverse the convictions of defendants herein.
POINT II
SECTION 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. IS INVALID ON ITS FACE
AND AS APPLIED TO THESE DEFENDANTS AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFRINGEMENT UPON THEIR RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
As indicated above, the Act at issue, in its original form,
was intended to fight the commercial and sexual exploitation of
minors.

Most of the case law dealing with matters at issue have

to do with commercial production and dissemination of allegedly
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sexual materials.

In this case, the conduct which took place

was between friends, in the privacy of the home of defendants,
and was not done for commercial use or profit.

While no direct

evidence was introduced to the effect that anyone involved was
"sexually aroused", it would appear from the Court's rulings
that a finding of sexual arousal was made by the Court.

It is

clear that the decision to pose for the pictures was made voluntarily by the minor involved (T.136-137).

-The United States

Supreme Court had occasion to rule on the right to privacy
regarding possession of alleged pornographic material in the
case of Stanley vs. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

The defendant

in that case was convicted for possession of obscene matter, and
argued that a state may not punish mere private possession of
obscene matter.

The Supreme Court agreed, and commented:

This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth (citations omitted) is
fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the
context of this case -- a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a
person's own home -- that right takes on an added
dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted government intrusions into one's privacy. 394
U.S. at 564.
He is asserting the right to read or observe what he
pleases -- the right to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. He
is asserting the right to be free from State inquiry
into the contents of his library. Georgia contends
that Appellant does not have these rights, that there
are certain types of materials that the individual may
not read or even possess . . . but we think that mere
categorization of these films as 'obscene' is insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of
personal liberties granted by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Whatever may be the justifications for
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other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not
think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home.
If the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control mens' minds. 394
U.S. at 565.
Admittedly, this case differs from the Stanley case in
that the acts complained of here involve more than one person,
one of whom is a minor.
herself

It appears, however, that the minor

may be constitutionally protected when engaging in

private conduct in the home of a friend, as much as the defendants may, in their own home.

It appears quite.clear that minors,

at least under some circumstances, are entitled to guarantees of
free speech, much as adults are.

In Tinker vs. Des Moines School

District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) the United States Supreme Court
held that high school students, aged 13, 15, and 16, were entitled
to First Amendment protection against a school district rule
which prohibited them from wearing arm bands to protest the war
in Vietnam.

In Gambino vs. Fairfax County School Board, 564 F.2d

157 (4th Cir. 1977) high school students were granted an injunction against their school board, prohibiting the interference
of the school board with their publication of an article about
birth control in a school newspaper.

In the case of Shanley vs.

Northeast Independent School Drstrict, Bexar Cd.Unty, Texas, 462
F.2d 960 (1972) the Court invalidated a school board policy prohibiting the dissemination of an unofficial "underground" student
newspaper which was published and distributed off campus, but only
to students.
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It should be noted here once again that the statute under
which Appellants were convicted prescribes the same penalties for
a parent or legal guardian of a child who photographs his nude
child, as for a stranger.

This is in contrast to Section 76-10-1206

which prohibits distributing harmful material to a minor, and
exempts parents or legal guardians from its prohibitions.

It is

the contention of Appellants herein that the statute is also
overbroad in that it prohibits acts done between consenting people
in the privacy of their homes, which do not amount to the promotion of obscenity; and also that it interferes illegally with the
relationship of a parent to his child.

Returning once again to

the Tinker case, the Southern California Law Review in its analysis
of the case, found it to be one in which the state was prohibited
from unwarranted interference in the family relationship.

In

describing the Tinker matter as a family .rights case, the Law
Review found that:
The students' decision to wear arm bands, according
to the Court, was reached at a meeting of both adults
and students, and the petitioners' parents concurred
in the decision.
In those circumstances the students'
rights to advocate a particular position gains considerably more strength, having behind it not merely
the weight of childish ratiocination and corrunitment,
but also the support of parental counsel on which
the students quite justifiably are entitled to rely.
It is not merely 'a symbolic battle between adults,
each using children as sacrificial pawns,' for the
children do have an interest in the matter. But that
interest is inextricably bound up in familial ties:
it is the right to be brought up, and to behave despite
state objection, in a way that parents have experienced
and found valuable.
51 S.Cal. L.Rev. 769 at 784.
Other Courts have also been faced with attempted State
interference in the relationships of parents with their children,
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and other minors in their home.

Courts in several states have

not only found that state prohibitions against serving alcohol
to minors did not apply to either parents or those who have had
minors as guests in their home.

In the case of People vs. Martell,

16 N.Y.2d 245, 264 N.Y.S.2d 913,

(N.Y. 1965), the New York Court

of Appeals had occasion to construe a state statute which made
guilty of a misdemeanor a person who "sells or gives away, or
causes or permits or procures to be sold or given away to any
child actually or apparently under the age of eighteen years any
alcoholic beverages as defined by the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law", 16 N.Y.2d 246 at 247.

The defendant in that case has

served alcoholic beverages to four children under the age of
eighteen years several times over a period of six months.

She

contended that the statute did not prohibit private acts done in
her home, despite the literal language.

The Court sidestepped

the issue of the constitutionality of a prohibition on such
private activities, by saying:
We need not go to the question of whether a statute
would be constitutional which made criminal the service
of alcoholic beverages, in a residence, to the children
of the house or to guests under eighteen years of age.
This appeal can be disposed of by simply holding that
subdivision three of Section 484 cannot reasonably be
read as making criminal such dispensing of drinks in
the home.
16 N.Y.2d 246 at 248. See also People vs.
Bird, 138 Mich. 31, 100 N.W. 1003 (Mich. 1904) and
Sfate vs. Hammons, 59 W.Va. 475, 53 S.E. 630 (W.Va. 1906).
The interest of parents in making decisions for their children was recognized by Ginsberg Court.

The Court there found that

the state's attempts to keep certain materials from children was
done in support of that parental right.

The Court stated:
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First of all, constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim
to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society.
'It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.'
(citations omitted).
The Legislature could properly conclude that parents
and others, teachers for example, who have this
primary responsibility for childrens' well-being
are entitled to the support of laws designed to
aid discharge of that responsibility.
Indeed,
subsection l(f) (ii) of Section 484-h expressly
recognizes the parental role in assessing sexrelated material harmful to minors according 'to
prevailing standards in the adult community as a
whole with respect to what is suitable material for
minors.' Moreover, the prohibition against sales
to minors does not bar parents who so desire from
purchasing the magazines for their children.390 U.S. at 639.
The statute at issue here is overbroad and constitutionally
invalid because it interferes with the right of privacy of both
children and adults, and interferes with their freedom of expression.

Moreover, it interferes with the relationship between

parents and children, and is an unconstitutional infringement
in an area where the state has no valid right to regulate.
POINT III
SECTION 76-10-1206.5 U.C.A. IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.
As referred to in the Statement of Facts at the beginning
of this Brief, the Information charged the defendants with using
"a minor, to pose in the nude while simulating sexual conduct ... "
Arguments have been presented regarding the insufficiency of
nudity as a grounds for suppression of the behavior.

The State's

position, of course, appears to be that the nudity in itself was
a sufficient violation of the law to justify conviction. The Supreme
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Court, in its Miller vs. California decision indicated that among
the types of material that could be suppressed as obscene were
"patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate
sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated."
25.

413 U.S. at

Obviously, the restrictions put on the types of material to

.be prohibited in the Miller vs. California decision are tighter
than those in the Utah Code.

The point to be made here, however,

is the additional requirement of the Miller vs. California case
that the depiction not only be "patently offensive" but that it
be of "sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
State law."

413 U.S. at 24.

The Utah

Code does indeed define

"sexual conduct" in Section 76-10-1201(7).

Nowhere, however, does

it define "simulating sexual conduct," the conduct charged here.
At trial, when the prosecutor introduced thirty (30) photographs
as evidence of the· crime, counsel for defendant Jordan objected
to the introduction of certain of the photographs, which did not
appear to include sexual or simulated sexual conduct (T. 128).
Counsel for defendant Fullmer did not join in that objection
because of our contention that the charge of nudity was sufficient to invalidate the charges in their entirety.

At any

rate, counsel for both parties participated in separating those
in which simulated sex acts might have occurred, and those in
which no such acts could have occurred, because only one person
was in those photographs.

No admission was made by anyone

representing the defense that any of the photographs did indeed
show "simulated sexual conduct"

(T.131).

In our final argument,
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it was our contention, and it remains our contention here, that
the term "simulated sexual conduct" is one that does not exist
in Utah law, and that defendants could not have known what conduct was proscribed, due to the lack of definition.
It is a settled rule of law that a statute written so vaguely
that it does not set out a clear standard of the behavior prohibited
is void as the denial of due process of law, as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.

That standard was set

out, among other places, in Champlin Refining Company vs. Corporation Commissioner, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct.559 (1932) where the United
States Supreme Court said:
In light of our decisions it appears upon a mere
inspection that these general words and phrases are
so vague and indefinite that any penalty prescribed
for their violation constitutes a denial of due process of law.
It is not the penalty itself that is
invalid, but the exaction of obedience to a rule or
standard that is so vague and indef inate as to be no
rule or standard at all. (citations omitted) 52 S.Ct.
at 568.
In a Utah case involving the regulation of massage parlors, Jensen
vs. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 530 P.2d 3 (Utah 1974)
this Court invalidated a county ordinance on the basis of vagueness:
The trial Court was of the opinion that the language of
the ordinance was so vague and uncertain as to render it
invalid. We conclude that the determination by the
trial court was correct. A person who might wish to
enter the field covered by the ordinance would be unable
to determine from this wording what qualifications or
skill would be necessary to qualify for a license. It
is noted that the ordinance uses the term 'massage
therapist' but nowhere is that term defined. 530 P.2d at 4.
In the instant case, sexual conduct is defined by Section 76-101201(7) as follows:
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'Sexual conduct' means acts of masturbation, sexual
intercourse or any touching of a person's clothed or
unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the
person is a female, breast, whether alone or between
members of the same or opposite sex or between humans
and animals in an act of apparent or actual sexual
stimulation or gratification.
The undisputed testimony at trial was that there was no sexual
activity between the minor and either of the defendants on the
day in question (T.137).

The definition of sexual conduct

requires a 'touching' of certain parts of the body of another.
One would have to assume that "simulated sexual conduct" might
require a "simulated touching", but such a term is almost impossible to understand.

If that term were construed to mean

"almost touching" the situation is only made worse, for lack of
guidelines as to how far away the two people could be, and still
be "almost touching".

The total lack of guidelines, along with

the apparent difficulty in using a :'common sense" approach to the
meaning, renders the term "simulated sexual conduct" without
meaning under the law.

If this term does not have a precise

meaning, as it would appear

the United States Supreme Court has

said it must, defendants cannot be held responsible for violating
the statute prohibiting it.
Thus, even without the obvious overbreadth, the statute
must fail for vagueness on its face, and as applied in the instant
case.

While there was some attempt at trial in this matter to

separate those photographs which might have involved that conduct
(simply because there was more than one person in the photograph)
and those that could not have, no evidence was ever put on that
the activity portrayed in any photograph was usimulated sexual
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conduct" and the Court appears to have made no ruling thereon.
For these additional reasons, the law must be invalidated and
the charges dismissed.
POINT IV
AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT.
The Affidavit supporting the issuance of the search warrant
in the present case was made by Officer Stewart Winn of the Orem
City Police Department on the 3rd day of November, 1981.

Para-

graph 2 of said Affidavit recites as follows:
That in that capacity on or about the 3rd day of
November, 1981, I received information from a confidential informant, whose code name is "Gorgo", that
a quantity of nude photographs, commonly referred to
as "child pornography" is being secreted at the address
of 754 South 50 East, Orem, Utah County, Utah. The
pornography is in the possession of Terry Fullmer, a
white female and of Robert Jordan, a black male. The
minor individual is a 15 year old female runaway by
the name of Holly Wilkerson.
Further in paragraph 4, the Affidavit recites:
... They then showed him a stack of approximately fifty
polaroid snapshots. They all showed Holly Wilkerson,
Terry Fullmer and Robert Jordan engaging in, or simulating sex acts. . . (T. 3-4) .
There was no representation in any of the allegations set
forth in the Affidavit where the affiant states that he has seen
the materials sought to be seized nor are the photographs described with particularity sufficient to give the Magistrate
probable cause to believe the materials sought are pornographic.
Utah

Code Annotated, Section 76-10-1212 provides procedural

requirements which must be met prior to the issuance of a warrant
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or the seizure of materials alleged to be pornographic.

At

Section 76-10-1212(1), the statute provides:
An affidavit for search warrant shall be filed with
the Magistrate describing with specificity the material
sought to be seized. Where practical, the material
alleged to be pornographic shall be attached to the
affidavit for search warrant so as to afford the Magistrate the opportunity to examine this material.
This

Court considered the foregoing statute in State v.

Piepenburg, 602 P.2d 702 where the defendant alleged that the
issuing Magistrate must personally view the alleged pornography
before a valid warrant could issue, 602 P.2d at 705.

The Court

ruled that a personal viewing of the alleged pornographic
materials is not required where the police officer's affidavit
and accompanying memorandum are sufficiently detailed to give
the issuing Magistrate an opportunity to

11

searchingly focus" on

the issue of obscenity.
In the present case, the Affidavit does not describe with
particularity the nature of the materials sought to be seized.
In fact, the affiant had not seen any of the photographs, but
relied upon the conclusions of the confidential informant. Those
conclusions constitute double hearsay in addition to their
conclusory nature.
The United States Supreme Court has held a search warrant
based solely upon conclusory assertions of a police officer to
be constitutionally infirm.

In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. vs. Virginia,

392 U.S. 636, two films were seized by authority of a warrant
issued by a Magistrate on the basis of an affidavit which stated
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only the titles of the films and the officer's conclusion that
they were obscene based upon the officer's personal observation
of the materials.

At 392 U.S. 637, the Court stated:

However, we need not decide in this case whether the
Justice of the Peace should have viewed the motion
picture before issuing the warrant. The procedure
under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the Justice of the Peace into the factual
bisis for the officer's conclusions was not a procedure
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of
obscenity", id. at 732, 81 S.Ct. at 1716, and therefore falls short of constitutional requirements demanding
necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression.
It would not have been of value for the Magistrate to have made
inquiry of the off icer-affiant in the present case to determine
the basis of his conclusions since the officer-affiant had not
personally viewed the materials sought to be seized, but was only
reporting the conclusions of a third party.
Such an affidavit fails to meet the requirements of Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 76-10-1212(1), as well
as the procedures set forth in State vs. Piepenberg, supra, and
the U.S. Constitutional requirements set forth in Lee Art Theatre,
Inc. vs. Virginia, supra, and the evidence obtained by authority
of the warrant issued in the present case should have been
suppressed.
POINT V
THE WARRANT WHICH WAS ISSUED IN THE PRESENT CASE WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFECTIVE SINCE IT DID NOT DESCRIBE
WITH SPECIFICITY THE ITEMS SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED BUT
LEFT THE DECISION TO DISCRETION OF THE OFFICERS EXECUTING THE WARRANT.

-30-
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The search warrant issued for the seizure of materials in
the present case describes the items to be seized as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE YOU AND EACH OF YOU are hereby directed
to conduct an immediate search during the daylight
hours of an apartment on the south side of the upper
level of a red brick four-plex, further identified by
the number 754 by the door, said apartment being located
at 754 South 50 East Street, Orem, Utah County, Utah,
for the presence therein of child pornography, and other
evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor. (Emphasis
added)
(T . 6 ) .
The decision concerning whether particular materials, in
this case photographs, were pornographic and therefore subject to
seizure, was left entirely to the discretion of the persons executing the search warrant.

The warrant did not limit the seizure

even to the photographs briefly described in the Affidavit as
depicting "sex acts", but broadly authorized the seizure of "child
pornography and other evidence of sexual exploi ta ti on of a minor",
leaving to the mind and imagination of the police officers as to
which items to seize.
The inventory of property taken by the authority of the
warrant in this case indicates the extent to which the constitutional restrictions upon such searches may be abused by police
officers when given such broad discretion.
quantity of "assorted instant photographs"

The officers seized a
(actually 265 "nude"

photographs only 30 of which pictured the juvenile and oniy ten
of those which could be claimed to picture "simulated sexual
conduct")

, "unexposed 35 mm. film", "flash cubes", "cloth sack",

"unexposed polaroid film" and a "General Electric color television
set".
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It is difficult to imagine what relevance unexposed film,
a cloth sack and a television set would have to do with "child
pornography or evidence of sexual exploitation of a minor".
Further, the seizure of 265 photographs, the majority of which do
not picture the minor at all, would appear to exceed even the
broad discretion set forth in the warrant.
Such a warrant has been determined to be constitutionally
defective.

In Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property at 104 East

Tenth Street, Kansas City, Missouri, etal., 367 U.S. 717, the
Court considered a seizure by warrant of various magazines alleged
to be obscene.

The directions in the warrant as to items seized

was " ... to search the said premises ... within 10 days after the
issuance of this warrant by day or night, and ... seize ... (obscene
materials) and take the same into your possession ... "

367 U.S. 722.

Following an in depth review of the historical development
of the law regarding the issues in this area, the Court concluded:
We believe that Missouri's procedures as applied in
this case lacked the safeguards which due process
demands to assure non-obscene material the constitutional protection to which it is entitled. Putting
to one side the fact that no opportunity was afforded
the appellants to elicit and contest the reasons .for
the officer's belief, or otherwise to argue against
the propriety of the seizure to the issuing Judge,
still the warrants issued on the strength of the
conclusory assertions of a single police officer,
without any scrutiny by the Judge of any materials
considered by the complainant to be obscene. The
warrants gave the broadest discretion to the executing
officers; they merely repeated the language of the
statute and the complainant specified no publications,
and left to the individual judgment of each of the many
police officers involved in the selection of such
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magazines as in his view constituted "obscene ...
publications" .
... In consequence there were suppressed and withheld
from the market for over two months, 180 publications
not found obscene.
The fact only one-third of the
publications seized were finally condemned strengthens
the conclusion that discretion to seize allegedly
obscene materials cannot be confined to law enforcement officials without greater safeguards than were
here operative. Procedures which sweep ~so broadly
and with so little d1scr1m1natiorr~re obviously deficient in techniques required by the ·Due Process
Clause of the Folirteenth Amendment ·to prevent erosion
of the constitutional guarantee.
367 U.S. 731, 732.
(Emphasis added)
Further, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. vs. New York, 442 U.S. 319,
the Court, upon considering a similar warrant stated:
Based on the conclusory statement of the police investigator that other similarly obscene materials would be
found at the store, the warrant left it entirely to the
discretion of the officials conducting the search to
decide what items were likely obscene and to accomplish
their seizure.
The Fourth Amendment does not permit such
action.
442 U.S. 325.
In the present case, where the officers executing the
warrants were left totally to their own discretion in what items
to seize, and where, in fact, they seized numerous items which
were not obscene or related to "child pornography", the search was
violative of the defendants' Fourth Amendment protections and the
evidence obtained thereby should have been suppressed.
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED BY OFFICERS SHOULD H..~VE BEEN
SUPPRESSED FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION
76-10-1212(3), REQUIRING A HEARING TO DETE~iINE
WHETHER THE MATERIALS SEIZED ARE, IN FACT, PORNOGRAPHIC.
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 76-10-1212(3)
provides:
In the event that a search warrant is issued and
material alleged to be p~rnographic is seized under
the provisions of this Section, any person claiming
to be in possession of this material or claiming
ownership of it at the time of its seizure may file
a notice in writing with the Magistrate within ten
days after the date of the seizure, alleging that the
material is not pornographic. The Magistrate shall
set a hearing within seven days after the filing of
this notice, or at such other time as the claimant
might agree. At this hearing evidence may be presented
as to whether there is probable cause to believe the
material is pornographic, and at the conclusion of the
hearing, the Magistrate shall make a further determination of whether probable cause exists to believe that
the material is pornographic. A decision as to whether
there is probable cause to believe the seized material
is pornographic shall be rendered by the Court within
two days after the conclusion of the hearing. If, at the
hearing the Magistrate finds that no probable cause exists
to believe that the material is pornographic, then the
material shall be returned to the person or persons from
whom it was seized.
The defendant Jordan filed a Notice of Claim that Material
Seized is not Pornographic on the 9th day of November, 1981, well
within the ten day limitation of the statute (T.7).

However, no

hearing was held by the Magistrate as required, nor was any hearing
ever held other than the trial which addressed the requirements of
Section 76-10-1212(3).
This Court considered the above-cited statute in State vs.
Piepenburg, supra, 602 P.2d 702, at 706, where the Court found
that the defendant could not assert the failure to hold a Section
76-10-1212(3) hearing as error where he did not comply with the
statute by filing the notice.

In the present case, the notice

was filed timely as provided by the statute.
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The United States Supreme Court in Heller vs. New York,
413 U.S. 483, held that no right existed to a prior hearing to
determine obscenity in all cases, but did recognize a right to
a prompt judicial determination of obscenity issues after the
seizure.

In the present case, the procedures established to

afford a prompt determination were not complied with and no
determination was actually made prior to trial.
The failure of the State to comply with the statutory and
constitutional safeguards required by Heller vs. New York, and
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Section 76-10-1212(3)
constitutes a substantial denial of the Fourth Amendment rights
of the defendants, especially in the present case where only a
limited number of items seized could conceivably come within the
perimeters of the statute under which the defendants were charged
and where only a few of the materials seized were admitted as
evidence at the trial.

Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence

should have been granted by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The judgment and verdict of the trial court should be
reversed because the law under which the defendants were convicted
is unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally vague; and
the law should be declared null and void.

In the alternative,

this Court should reverse the trial court on the grounds that
the photographic evidence used at trial was illegally seized and
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illegally held pending trial, and therefore should have been
suppressed.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of June, 19 82.
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APPENDIX A
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